Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act: The Tolling
Effect of Government Antitrust Actions
on Unnamed Parties
Big money makes substantial law out of what may have appeared to be small
questions.
Matteoni, An Antitrust
Argument

If a government action to enforce the antitrust laws results in a final
judgment or decree to the effect that a defendant has violated those laws,
section 5 of the Clayton Act' allows the use of such a finding as prima
facie evidence in a subsequent treble damage suit as to "all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto."'2 Section 5 also provides that the institution of a government antitrust action will toll the running of the statute
of limitations 3 as to any private antitrust cause of action "based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of" in the government proceeding, during the pendency of the United States' action, and for one
year thereafter. 4 Michigan v. Morton Salt Co.5 is the first case to hold
1 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). Section 5(a), in its entirety reads: "A final judgment or
decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought
by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a
defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant
in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under
said laws or by the United States under Section 15a of this title, as to all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties
thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in
actions under Section 15a of this title."
3 The statute of limitations applicable to all civil antitrust actions is four years.
69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
4 15 U.S.C. § 16(b). The entire text of § 5(b) is as follows: "Whenever any civil or
criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain or punish
violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 15a
of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private right
of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and
for one year thereafter: Provided: however, That whenever the running of the statute
of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is
suspended hereunder, and action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever
barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years
after the cause of action accrued."
The two provisions, formerly separate paragraphs of § 5, were denominated separate
subsections by the 1955 amendments to the antitrust statutes, 69 Stat. 283 (1955). Most
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that a government action suspended the running of the statute with
respect to parties joined as defendants in a treble damage action who
had not been defendants in the action by the United States (herein
"non-government defendants"). In this it stands alone against a considerable body of earlier precedent.
This comment will examine the Morton Salt approach, and the
general theories of application of the tolling provision. After examining
alternative statutory constructions, an attempt will be made to draw
meaningful guidelines upon which the ambit of the tolling provision
should be conditioned, considering both the practical positions of the
treble damage plaintiff and the non-government defendant, and
relevant antitrust policies.
I.

SECTION 5-CoNSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

A. Coextensiveness and Congressional Intent
At the threshold of the investigation of the applicability of section 5
against non-government defendants lies the question of the relationship
between sections 5(a) and 5(b). One of the earliest and most influential
cases to consider this problem was Momand v. Universal Film Exchange,6 the first instance of an attempted application of the tolling
provisions against non-government defendants.7 The court there viewed
of the cases discussed herein were decided on the basis of § 5 undivided into subsections (a) and (b). However, for the sake of convenience and clarity, the two provisions will be referred to as §§ 5(a) and 5(b), whether or not they were so considered
in the case under discussion.
The 1955 amendments do not seem to be of any significance with regard to the instant
problem. In rejecting the contention that Congress's failure to change the essential
wording of the two sections indicated a legislative intent to leave prior case law undisturbed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: "'We find nothing in the language of
the amendment itself or in its legislative history which evidences such an intention. ....
Clearly, Congress did not concern itself with the application of the tolling provision . . .
to those defendants who were not named in the government action." Hardy Salt Co. v.
Illinois, TRADE REG. REP'. (1967 Trade Cas.)
72104, at 83,962 (8th Cir. May 22, 1967),
affirming Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966).
5 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub noma. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, TRADE
REG. R . (1967 Trade Cas.)
72104 (8th Cir. May 22, 1967) (a group of consolidated

suits by agencies of various states against producers and distributors of rock salt used
in maintaining state and municipal roads).
6 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942) (Wyzanski, J.), aff'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948). The
case involved a treble damage suit brought by the assignee of independent movie theater
owners against the major film makers and distributors, alleging that the exhibitors
were forced to enter into oppressive licensing agreements as a result of a conspiracy
to eliminate competition in the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion
pictures.
7 It will be noted that the question of the applicability of § 5(b) to parties not joined
in a prior government action arises because some participants in a conspiracy in restraint
of trade may be spared prosecution by the Government. The Justice Department and the
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the tolling provision, section 5(b), as merely a necessary adjunct to the
prima facie evidence clause, section 5(a). Thus, the tolling provision
would operate against a defendant only if the judgment or decree that
the Government might have won in the prior action could have served
as evidence against that defendant under section 5(a). Since by the
terms of section 5(a), a judgment or decree obtained by the Government can only be used against a defendant in the government litigation,
the running of the statute of limitations with respect to non-government
defendants would not be tolled by section 5(b).8
The Momand court's conclusion 9 that Congress had intended section
5(b) as little more than an "enabling" provision for section 5(a), and
that the two provisions were therefore coextensive 0 was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co."1 In Minnesota Mining the Court was faced with the
problem of whether an FTC proceeding would toll the running of the
statute under section 5(b). The Court assumed arguendo that an FTC
decree would not be admissible under section 5(a), and thus came to
2
grips with the question of the coextensiveness of the two provisions.'
The Court concluded that, while in section 5(a) Congress was concerned with the "narrow issue" of the use of judgments obtained by
the Government in treble damage actions, 13 it had in mind a broader
FTC have limited funds and staff, KAYSEN & TURNR, ANTITRUST PoLIcY 247 (1959) (hereinafter cited as KAYSEN & TumRR), and in view of this, considerations of economy militate
toward selective enforcement in many situations. It may be anticipated that prosecution
of the key participants in the conspiratorial activities will generally serve to put an
end to the conspiracy as a whole. Such a belief may lead the enforcement agency to
minimize the number of parties and integrations attacked in one proceeding, in order to
simplify the unavoidably complex matters of fact and economic analysis that will have
to be proven. This may be a particularly compelling consideration' in the event of
judicial proceedings, where the case will not be heard by a specialist tribunal. See
Tr

PoRARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC ComrmsiT=rr,

76TH CONG., 3D Sass., ANTiTRusT IN ACTION

82-84 (Comm. Print 1940) (hereinafter cited as TNEC). Moreover, it seems likely, especially
in the case of the FTC, that informal negotiations may result in some conspirators
voluntarily abandoning the conspiracy, with proceedings being instituted only against
the more recalcitrnt offenders. See also note 55 infra.
8 Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 996, 1011 (D. Mass. 1942).
9 Concurred in by many courts since. See, e.g., Farmington Dowel Products Co. v.
Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Me. 1963).
10 "This is clear from the juxtaposition of the two paragraphs which together constitute Section 5 of the Clayton Act." Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, Inc., 43 F.
Supp. 996, 1012 (D. Mass. 1942).
11 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
12 On both the question faced and the question avoided in Minnesta Mining, see
Matteoni, An Antitrust Argument, 40 NoTmE DAME L&w. 158 (1965); Rockefeller, The
Supreme Court and the Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 7 B.C. IND. & Cois. L. Rxv. 279 (1966).
'3 381 U.S. at 317.
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purpose in connection with section 5(b).14 The opinion considered it
"plain" that in enacting the tolling provision "congress meant to assist
private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust actions."' 15 The Court recognized that, in addition to
benefits under section 5(a):
The Government's initial action may aid the private litigant
in a number of other ways. The pleadings, transcripts of testimony, exhibits and documents are available to him in most
instances. .

.

. Moreover, difficult questions of law may be

tested and definitively resolved before the private litigant
enters the fray.' 6
If, therefore, section 5(b) is to fulfill its omnibus function, the Court
reasoned, its operations should not be confined to cases in which the
prima facie evidence provision is also applicable; benefits-pleadings,
transcripts, exhibits, legal resolutions-flow as freely from proceedings
which would not furnish benefits under section 5(a).17
The Court's conclusion that Congress had a broader purpose with
respect to section 5(b) than merely to provide a logical backstop for
section 5(a) is, however, without affirmative support in the congressional
history of the legislation. Indeed, not once is the tolling provision
mentioned, except, and then only in passing, as a necessary complement
to the prima facie evidence clause.' By the same token, however, the
legislators expressed no intention contrary to, or out of harmony with,
the Minnesota Mining interpretation of the statute. Rather, the Court's
construction seems to be consistent with the broad congressional policy
which it quite reasonably finds embodied in section 5(b): the desire to
allow private litigants to take advantage of any benefits they might cull
from government antitrust actions. 19 In all likelihood, the legislators
14 Ibid.

15
16
17
18

Ibid.
581 U.S. at 319.
381 U.S. at 820.
The Court even conceded: "The fact of the matter is that the records of the 1914

legislative proceedings reveals an almost complete absence of any discussion of the tolling
problem." 381 U.S. at 320.
19 Section 5 was made a part of the Clayton Act apparently upon the request of President
Wilson, who asked for a provision that would permit parties injured by antitrust violators
to base recovery upon matter proved and adjudicated in suits brought by the Government,
and would provide that "the statute of limitations . . . be suffered to run against such
litigants only from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action." 51 CONG. R.Ec.
1964 (1914). The rationale behind the enactment was that aggrieved private parties
should not have to retrace the costly route of proof that had been travelled by the
Government: the "entire provision [was] intended to help persons of small means who
are injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations violating

the antitrust laws." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). Thus, § 5 represents
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simply did not think of benefits beyond those assured in section 5(a),
but Minnesota Mining clearly represents a valid extrapolation of their
desire to give substantial assistance to treble damage claimants.
B. Supervening Requirements and CongressionalIntent
Some courts, beginning with Christensen v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 20 have based their opposition to the use of section 5(b) against nongovernment defendants on a narrower ground than the coextensiveness
argument urged in Momand and disapproved in Minnesota Mining.
They have maintained that written into section 5(b) is a supervening
requirement that its application be limited to defendants who were
named in the prior government action. The argument is that when
using the words "any matter complained of," Congress had reference
to the acts of the defendants of which the Government may have complained. 21 In support of this construction, Christensenurged the following language of the 1914 House Report on section 5: "This section also
provides that the statute of limitations shall be suspended in favor of
private litigants who have sustained damage to their property or business by the wrongful acts of the defendant .... "22 The difficulty with
this argument is that the Report's language does not define the limits of
the statute's application. It could just as readily be inferred that the
legislators had not considered the possibility of applying the tolling provision against non-government defendants, 23 as that Congress consciously
desired to limit the scope of section 5(b). Furthermore, that Congress
meant to make section 5(b) a provision of broad application seems evia congressional policy favoring treble damage suits, and a realization of the practical
difficulties confronting a treble damage plaintiff. Cf. Dession, The Trial of Economic and
Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE LJ. 1019 (1942); TNEC, at 83-84.
20 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950), where a local movie theater owner sued major producers and distributors of motion pictures and a local exhibitor who had obtained unreasonable and preferential runs and clearances, relying on the judgment against the
producers and distributors in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948), in which the local exhibitor had not been joined.
21 Court Degraw Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1959);
Electric Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 945
(W.D. Mo. 1953); Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950).
22 H.R. REP. No. 15657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).
23 On the other hand, proponents of tolling against non-government defendants note
that, while the focus of § 5(a) is on the defendant, on its face § 5(b) "is not concerned
with the defendants against whom the limitations period may be tolled," and therefore cannot be limited to use against government defendants. Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F.
Supp. 35, 55 (1966). In light of the legislative silence on the ambit of the tolling provision,
this argument may be unconvincing, but it strengthens the view that Congress did not
intend to restrict the use of the tolling provision to causes of action against defendants
named by the Government.
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dent from the policy it embodies and from its potential utility in the
24
context of antitrust legislation.
C. Severability Applied-The New Solution
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.25 represents an expansion of the
Minnesota Mining principle. In Leh, the Supreme Court held the running of the statute tolled under section 5(b) even though the treble
damage claimant alleged conspiratorial activities that were slightly
different from those averred in the initial government action; the case,
however, did not involve non-government defendants. Taken together
with Minnesota Mining, Leh largely discredited Christensen'sreliance
on the phrase "matter complained of" to preclude the broad application of section 5(b). At the same time, the approach of such cases as
Steinerv. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.26 which required that "the same
means... to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by the
same defendants" 27 must be alleged in both actions in order to activate
the tolling provision was overruled. In Leh the Court found that the
subject matter differences between the two actions did not foreclose application of section 5(b):
[E]ffect must be given to the broad terms of the statute itself"based in whole or in part on any matter complained of-(emphasis added) read in light of Congress's "belief that
weapons for
private antitrust litigation is one of the surest
' 28
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."
And in this light, concern for the good faith of the private plaintiff in
invoking the tolling provision (i.e., that his action was actually delayed
in the expectation of help from the government litigation) must not
lead to "a niggardly construction of the statutory language here in
29
question."
Michigan v. Morton Salt Co.30 dealt specifically with the problem
31
of a limitations defense interposed by non-government defendants.
24 See section IIB of this comment infra.
25 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
26 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956). The facts were largely similar to those of Christensen

v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950), note 20 supra.
27 232 F.2d at 196.
28 382 U.S. at 59.
29

Ibid.

30 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, TRADE
72104 (8th Cir. May 22, 1967).
RE. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.)
31 The non-government defendants included some parties who had been named as coconspirators in the prior government action. The district court held that no distinction
need be drawn between such parties and those who were not so designated. 259 F. Supp.
35, 55 (D. Minn. 1966). The court of appeals did not decide the question, since the only
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Both Judge Larson's district court opinion and Judge Matthes' opinion
for the circuit court of appeals indicated that the situation was controlled by the principles of Minnesota Mining and Leh. They reasoned
that prior case law, whether grounded in notions of coextensiveness
or supervening requirements, was effectively discredited by the Supreme Court's recent decisions; they rejected out of hand the suggestion
that dissimilarity of parties defendant creates problems of special
significance, or that it must be considered in a light different from any
other sort of variance in the subject matter of the two complaints. Thus,
the private and government complaints were found to be substantially
identical and the private plaintiffs were allowed to invoke the tolling
provision against all the defendants, including those not joined by the
Government.
II.

TOLLING AGAINST

THE NON-GOVERNMENT

DEFENDANT-POLICIES AND REALITIES

A.

The Effect of Tolling on Non-parties to the Government Action

Two sorts of arguments may be advanced against allowing a government action to toll the running of the statute of limitations against nongovernment defendants. The first focuses on the detrimental effects on
the non-government defendants; the second involves judgments about
the effect of such a doctrine on the business community as a whole.
It may be argued that where a non-party to the government action is
later joined in a treble damage suit that would be barred were it not for
the operation of section 5(b), his ability to present a defense will have
been greatly impaired through loss of evidence and passage of time.3 2
However, it seems doubtful that a member of a business community
that has been attacked in part by government action will be unaware of
that action; if the given party was closely involved with the Government's defendants, whether culpably or not, it is suggested that some
effort would be made by that party to determine the legal and practical
appellant had been a named coconspirator in the prior government action. Under the
analyses suggested in section II of this comment infra, there seems no functional distinction between named coconspirators and other non-government defendants.
32 Some may argue that lack of notice of the suspension of the running of the limitations period may result in destruction of evidence which would otherwise have been
kept. Of course, the culpable potential defendant may very well want to destroy incriminating records. Where those records are required by law to be kept for a certain length
of time, and an action is brought against the party responsible for their maintenance at
a date later than the period during which their maintenance is required-as is possible
under a Morton Salt reading of § 5(b), and possibly not otherwise-that party would
avoid the permissible, unfavorable inference which would arise upon their nonproduction
had the suit been brought during the period of time in which they were required to
be kept. Cf. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2524 (Sd ed. 1940), and authorities cited therein.
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effect of that action upon its position, and to take whatever steps may be
deemed necessary by typically wary corporate managers to safeguard its
interests.

33

Furthermore, the lengthy nature of most antitrust litigation 34 during
35
which witnesses may die or move, and memories may fade, would
seem to work the same ravages upon the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff,
in fact, may be more seriously disadvantaged, since he bears the burden
of proof. Moreover, he must often rely heavily on the testimony of
persons closest to the activities of the defendant, whose interests would
presumably be adverse to those of the plaintiff, and whose propensity
to forget incriminating facts may be aided by the passage of time.
The second argument against a Morton Salt construction of section
5(b) is based on the proposition that the prolongation of the possibility
of treble damage suits against a segment .of the business community will
have an inhibiting effect on the conduct of that community's business
affairs; 36 this situation, moreover, may continue for a great period of
33 Absence of evidence is not solely a problem of non-government defendants. One can
conceive of situations in which the availability of evidence would make it easier for a
non-government defendant to defend against a subsequent private action than it would
be for a party to the government suit. Since the private plaintiff can proceed against the
government defendant even if they had no direct business dealings, see notes 42-44 infra,
and accompanying text, the government defendant, in such a case, may be hard pressed
to refute allegations of injury stemming from transactions in which he was not directly
involved. While the non-government defendant may have lost evidence concerning his
dealings with the plaintiff, the government defendant never had any.
34 See KAYSEN & TuRN-R 247. We may anticipate litigation that goes all the way to
the Supreme Court lasting some eight to twelve years. United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), for example, lasted nine.
35 One of the prime objectives of statutes of limitation in general is to prevent claims
from springing up long after the cause of action accrued, and surprising opposing parties
when necessary evidence has been lost or depleted or the facts have become obscure from
lapse of time or the defects of memory, death, or removal of witnesses. Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1944); Order of Railway Express Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1943); Roland Electric Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 417 (4th Cir.

1947).
36 Sales

of businesses, or issues of stocks or bonds will be impaired by investors' fear
of a possible treble damage action against the company. This insecurity, of course, will
touch virtually all members of the segment of the business community attacked by the
Government, since at the time of the government action it will not be possible to predict
against whom treble damage actions will be brought, or in respect of which of these
actions § 5(b) will operate to toll the running of the statute.
A simple expedient might be proposed for eliminating the problems associated with
uncertainty as to whether or not a given party will be subject to the operation of the
tolling provision. A provision might be added to § 5(b) to the effect that if a private
party wished to rely upon a government action to toll the running of the statute in
favor of a party not a defendant thereto, he would be required to so notify the potential
defendant, before the expiration of the normal four year limitations period (subject to
expansion by findings of fraudulent concealment or the like). The provision would have
the virtue of delimiting the complete range of parties against whom treble damage suits
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time, the length of which is chiefly conditioned on the desire of the
parties to the government action to contest.
Of course, this insecurity in the business community will result from
a government action even if section 5(b) is narrowly applied. 7 But the
wisdom of allowing such a state of affairs to be extended for a virtually
indeterminate period, to the detriment of what may be a large group of
potential defendants who have no control over the period's length, must
be subject to some doubts. These doubts are considerably allayed by
the recognition that practical solutions to many of the problems of
commercial insecurity have been devised,38 and by plaintiffs' and the
general public's interests in broad application of section 5(b).
B. Public Policy and the PrivatePlaintiff
The advantages which may accrue to a private plaintiff through the
application of section 5(b), as suggested by Minnesota Mining,39 include
access to evidence, knowledge of the probability of success, and the pretesting of legal theories; the expense involved in bringing suit may be
greatly reduced by the availability of such benefits.
It may be argued that, while a plaintiff might benefit from the government action if he chooses to sue non-government defendants, he will not,
or at least need not, include such parties. It is true that in the large majority of cases, a treble damage claimant will not be in a position where he
must sue non-government defendants or go without relief. Liability for
acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy or combination in restraint of
trade is joint and several, 40 and full damages are therefore recoverable
from any member of the conspiratorial group.4 1 For reasons which will
might arise after the expiration of the four year period, and it might help to insure
against invocation of the tolling provision as an afterthought, solely to breathe new life
into an otherwise stale claim.
On the other hand, because of the great ease with which such a provision could be
abused, its operation might only serve to produce even greater chaos in the business
community; blanket notices could be sent by potential plaintiffs to every member of the
affected economic sector, crystalizing and amplifying the insecurity created by the government action. Furthermore, in any given case the sending of such a notice by one party
to another with which it was doing business would probably result in strained relations
between the two; multiplied many times, this might have deleterious effects on the flow
of commerce.
87 Government accusation of illegal conduct suggests the possibility of related treble
damage suits waiting in the wings, and these actions may be brought with or without
benefits under § 5. See TNEC 80.
88 One possibility is the sale of a business free of pre-existing liabilities. See Michigan
v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 55 (D. Minn. 1966).
89 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 218 F.2d 284, 293 (7th Cir. 1954);
City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry &-Pipeworks, 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903).
41 This is so whether or not the plaintiff has had direct dealings with the member of
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become apparent later, 42 government defendants will probably always be
jointly liable with non-government defendants against whom section 5(b)
is properly applied. Therefore, while in any given case the question of
whether or not to apply section 5(b) against a non-government defendant will be critical to the defendant-since the claim against it would
otherwise be barred-it will probably not be so important for the
43
private plaintiff.
Nevertheless, a broad reading of section 5(b), which would allow a
private plaintiff to partake of the benefits of a government action and
later apply them in a suit involving non-government defendants, seems
especially desirable for two reasons. First, under the assumption that
full enforcement 44 of any remedial statute is desirable, it may be maintained that any firm or individual participating in antitrust violations
should suffer legal sanctions. 45 Accordingly, the treble damage action
the conspiracy that he sues, Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955), and despite the fact that the conspirator against whom recovery is sought was not
a direct participant in, or received no direct benefit from, the particular acts complained
of, if they were in furtherance of the conspiracy of which he was a part. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
42 See notes 57-63, 65 infra and accompanying text.
43 There are, of course, practical exceptions to this rule: it may be that some of the
governmentally prosecuted defendants are not amenable to suit, either within the jurisdiction of the federal district court in the plaintiff's state, or generally, because of final
dissolution; or the parties sued by the Government may now be insolvent, making a
judgment against them relatively valueless. Although the probability of such circumstances
seems rather limited, the possibility of their existence, in view of the remedial policy
of antitrust legislation, certainly militates toward a broad application of § 5(b).
Actually, the suggestion that government defendants may subsequently be found to be
insolvent may not be quite as improbable as it seems, even in the face of the Government's customary practice of prosecuting chiefly the larger concerns, and the fact that
such conspiracies generally involve fairly substantial members of oligopolistic industries.
See KAYsEN & TURNER 41. The pendency of a government action of necessity affects the
commercial fortunes of a defendant thereto; investors certainly will hesitate to gamble
on the enterprise, and others may shy away from doing business with it.
44 It must be borne in mind that treble damage actions were conceived as more than
simple tort remedies; rather, the private antitrust action is considered an important mode
of enforcement of the antitrust laws. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965) ("Congress has expressed its belief that private
antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws.'); TNEC 82.
45 On the other hand, it has been argued that an expansive construction of § 5(b)
would actually work to the detriment of government enforcement activities. Excluding
consent decrees from the prima facie evidence provisions of § 5(a) clearly represents a
governmental desire to encourage prompt redress of antitrust violations through out of
court settlements negotiated by violator and enforcement agency. Earlier cases held that
when a defendant settles a government action, that action is no longer "pending" as to
him, and the statute of limitations therefore begins to run again, see e.g., Sun Theatre
Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954); Barnett v. Warner Bros.
Pictures Distributing Corp., 112 F. Supp. 5 (D.C. 1953), and this doctrine clearly encour-
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would seem to be most effective as a means of filling gaps in the pattern
47
6
of what must be selective prosecution4 by the federal government.
The fact that the remedy of treble damages is penal or punitive in character not only supports this observation, but also suggests that Congress
considered private retribution, as well as compensation and enforce48
ment, when providing for such suits.

ages early settlement of government suits. But in Morton Salt, the district court ruled
that release by consent decree does not restart the running of the limitations period as
to that defendant. 259 F. Supp. 35, 48-50 (D. Minn. 1966) (The point was not at issue
on appeal, as all defendants to whom it might have been relevant had since settled out
of the litigation.). The argument is that this holding takes away the government's "bargaining advantage" in negotiating consent decrees, and will therefore defeat the salutory
policy of encouraging such settlements.
The district court decided the question of release by noting that Minnesota Mining
and Leh emphasized the interest in promoting treble damage actions, and found this
interest controlling. Judge Larson observed that while it is true that release of one
defendant may end the possibility of § 5(a) benefits against that party, it does not end
the continuing utility of the government litigation in making out a complete case against
the released defendant; therefore, §§ 5(a) and (b) are not coextensive, tolling must
continue as long as the government action is pending as to anyone. (Judge Larson also
noted that it would be a great burden on private plaintiff to have to bring an action
against, or join each defendant in a subsisting action as he is released from the government suit, and then argue for continuances until evidentiary benefits are exhausted.)
Such a holding is certainly doctrinally consistent with the rest of Morton Salt; moreover,
to hold otherwise would create the anomaly of released government defendants being in
a better position, with respect to the statute of limitations, than are parties who have
never been joined in that litigation at all.
This analysis would suggest that there is an irrevocable tension between the interests
of the private and public arms of antitrust enforcement; if this is so, it is submitted that
the congressional policy embodied in § 5 must control, and the private plaintiff must
be served. However, in all probability, government enforcement practice will not really
be hampered by a Morton Salt approach to § 5(b). Release by consent decree means that
a defendant will not be subject to the prima facie evidence provision of § 5(a). The availability of § 5(a) benefits against a defendant would certainly seem to encourage private
actions against that party, and is far more dangerous and damaging to a defendant than
the subsidiary benefits which may accrue to a treble damage plaintiff from the trial of
a government action. Thus, release from the provisions of § 5(a) is the most powerful
lever for the Government in negotiating consent decrees, and the inability to release
a party from further tolling would not seem to materially weaken the Government's
position.
46 See note 7 supra.
47 "They [treble damage suits] may be the most effective way of policing the multitude
of comparatively local and insignificant violations that will tend to escape the glance
.of federal enforcement authorities or that, even if noticed, do not merit the expenditure
of limited enforcement resources." KAYSEN & TURNER 257. This would seem no less true
even where overriding conspiratorial arrangements in the same segments of the economy
have not "escaped the glance" of enforcement authorities. In this way, treble damage
actions might serve to pull in the loose ends of conspiratorial activity attacked generally
by the United States.
48 This observation is apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court: "It is clear that
Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement and to arm
injured persons with private means to retribution when it gave to any injured party a
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Second, it should be observed that while the Government's selective
enforcement may operate to bring to an end the entire scope of conspiratorial activities of any given integration attacked in part,49 facilitating private antitrust suits against participants not sued by the Government should increase the overall deterrent efficacy of the antitrust
statutes. Since many kinds of unlawful agreements may not be effective
without vertical integration of lower-level participants, 50 a Morton
Salt construction of section 5(b) gives the statute greater deterrent effect
by increasing the likelihood of an antitrust action against low level
conspirators who may otherwise escape government prosecution.
III.

STRUCTURING THE SOLUTION

Given that facilitating treble damage suits against non-government
defendants may at times outweigh the interests of such defendants and
the business community in general in avoiding the consequences of
depletion of evidence and commercial insecurity, there remains the
problem of determining the proper scope of the tolling provisions.
Minnesota Mining and Leh made some progress toward a definition
of the limit of variance between the government and private actions
permissible under section 5(b). Minnesota Mining allowed the government action to toll the running of the statute in respect to the treble
damage suit when the Court found that "both suits set up substantially
the same claims." 51 Leh was somewhat more explicit, if not illuminating, on the requirement of substantial similarity: while the two complaints52 must bear a "real" relationship, a detailed duplication of
private cause of action in which his damages are to be made good threefold, with costs
of suit and reasonable attorney's fees." Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743,
751-52 (1947).
If retribution is a congressionally approved value in the antitrust setting, it must be
desirable to allow the private plaintiff to include in his action those whose acts most
directly or offensively harmed him.
49 See note 7 supra.
50 See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 391-465 (1966).
51 381 U.S. at 323.
52 Since tolling operates from the point of the institution of the government action,
and a private litigant can only base his expectations of benefits on what may be ascertained about the Government's action at that time, Leh very properly notes that: "suspension of the running of the statute of limitations pending resolution of the government
action may not be made to turn on whether the United States is successful in proving
the allegations of its complaint." 382 U.S. at 65. Inasmuch as the limitations issue is
presented at the threshold of the private action, the Court continues: "The availability
of § 5(b) to the private claimant may not be made dependent on his ability to prove his
case, however fatal failure may prove to his hopes of success on the merits." Ibid. Thus,
the decision as to tolling is dependent solely upon "a comparison of the two complaints
on their face." Ibid.
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claims is not required.53 Of course, if the subject matter of the two
suits is not largely the same, the government action will not really
provide, or have promised to provide, the private plaintiff with the sort
of benefits contemplated by the Court, and purported reliance on a
government suit, the complaint in which does not bear a real relation
to the private suitor's claim for relief, would be a mere sham. 54
Morton Salt takes the substantial similarity requirement, or, in the
words of that decision, the "test of substantial identity," as absolutely
controlling in the case of all variances between the two actions-including variances in parties defendant. Both the district court and circuit
court of appeals reasoned that the relevance of the government action
to the treble damage claimant's case is the sole criterion for applying
the tolling provision, and that since lack of government joinder may
well be unrelated to involvement in the matters complained of in that
action, 55 the identity of parties defendant is merely another factor to
be considered, along with allegations of time, place, and actions. When
examining the substance of the two complaints, the parties factor has no
independent or unique force in the equation. 56
The thrust of the substantial similarity requirements developed in
Minnesota Mining, Leh, and Morton Salt is that the congressional
purpose of allowing a private plaintiff to cull benefits from government
litigation is only served if section 5(b) is invoked where reliance on
the Government is not a fraud, and where it is at least possible that the
private plaintiff delayed bringing suit in the expectation of real benefits from the initial proceeding.
There are many situations in which matters that the Government
necessarily will prove under the allegations of its complaint will
promise to be of substantial value to the private plaintiff in the development of a subsequent suit involving non-government defendants:
for example, when the plaintiff has been injured by local activities in
fullfillment of a nationwide conspiracy; or when the antitrust violations which caused injury to the plaintiff were initiated by conspirators
otherwise vertically linked to the combination attacked by the United
53

882 U.S. at 59.

54 Ibid.

55 See note 7 supra. The Supreme Court, if only by way of dictum, adverted to this in
Leh, in a passage that both Morton Salt courts relied heavily upon: "In suits of this kind,
the absence of complete identity of defendants may be explained on several grounds unrelated to the question of whether the private claimant's suit is based on matters of which
the Government complained ....
[S]ome of the conspirators whose activities injured the
private claimant may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected as named
defendants or co-conspirators in the Government's necessarily broader net." Leh v. General
Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1965).
56 See Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 53-54 (D. Minn. 1966).
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States; 57 or, in the simplest case, where the non-government defendants were co-conspirators with the parties named by the Government
on the same horizontal level of integration. In instances such as these,
the Government will prove agreements and acts in furtherance of those
agreements. Proof of facts such as these is necessary to a private plaintiff's case.5s
On the other hand, the Government's proof may be relevant to the
private plaintiff's case but not of substantial value. The private plaintiff may wish to use a crime proved by the Government as character
evidence;5 9 he may wish to use acts proved by the Government for purposes of impeachment, 60 or as evidence of bias;61 or he may hope to
have points of law researched and general background information
assembled concerning the techniques and economics of antitrust violations similar to his own case, as, for example, price fixing.6 2 It may
also be that while government proof of its allegations might constitute weighty circumstantial evidence with respect to the plaintiff's
claim, those proofs would not constitute a necessary ingredient of the
63
plaintiff's case.
57 As, for example, nationwide activities of distribution subsidiaries of conspiring manufacturing firms in a given industry. Something like the situation in United States v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) may be envisioned here; in
Columbia Pictures, however, only one distribution subsidiary, Screen Gems, Inc., was
involved. It was wholly owned by one of the two defendant movie makers.
58 For example, just as proof that national film makers and distributors A, B, C, and
D conspired together on a nationwide scale would not entitle a movie theater operator
to recover in a treble damage action, absent a showing of how that conspiracy affected
business in his locality, so, presumably, proof that E, a local exhibitor, had obtained
unreasonably favorable exhibition rights would not make out a complete claim for relief
unless the plaintiff also showed that such exhibition rights were the fruits of a conspiracy
in restraint of trade involving the producers and distributors of the films: A, B, C and
D. Cf. Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284, 290 (7th Cir. 1954).
59 See, e.g., Mourikas v. Vardianos, 169 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1948).
60 See, e.g., Barnard v. Wabash Ry., 208 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1953).
61 See, e.g., Terminal Transport Co. v. Foster, 164 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1929).
02 For example, government proof of a price fixing conspiracy among the five major
producers of steel would certainly be instructive to a private plaintiff seeking to prove
a similar conspiracy among the five major producers of copper.
63 This is perhaps the closest case of the lot. For example, consider the following
hypothetical situation: The major American extractors of a given raw material have, by
fixing prices at an abnormally high level, forced firms in a subordinate or derivative
industry-producers or refiners of this raw material-into a position where they cannot
sell at prices competitive with those of a foreign firm which both extracts and processes
this material. (Previously, shipping costs had prevented the foreign company from competing in the American market.) However, the foreign firm can only supply a percentage
of any one manufacturer's requirements of the processed material. To compel all the
manufacturers to purchase the full amount of their requirements from them, the domestic
processors agree among themselves to refuse to sell to any manufacturer who purchases
from the foreign firm. (This boycott is effective since any given manufacturer is forced

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:906

In either of the preceding sets of examples, the complaints in the
government and private actions may present largely similar, or even
identical, factual situations. But while tolling the statute against nongovernment defendants in the first class of cases is desirable, it is submitted that the benefits to treble damage claimants in the second class
are not so great as to outweigh the detrimental effects upon non-government defendants and the business community in general; such a
doctrine might well open a veritable Pandora's box, rendering the
statute of limitations all but meaningless, and vitiating the policies it
represents. It is suggested, then, that in testing the applicability of the
tolling provision to non-government defendants in any given case,
within the framework of the requirement of substantial similarity, 4
the measure of the requisite relationship between the two complaints
should be keyed to whether acts and agreements that the Government
would prove under the allegations of its complaint will be necessary
to the private plaintiff's recovery against the non-government defendants6 5
Given this gloss on the formulation, and the assurances it provides,
Morton Salt, and the approach it represents, must be approved. An
excessively restrictive rule of application of section 5(b) is not consonant with the policies underlying the enactment or the realities of
to choose between contracting his operations and buying at the higher price on the
domestic American market.) Although the action of the American extractors may be said
to be responsible for the processors' unlawful agreement, and proofs adduced by the
United States in an action against the extractors would seem to be relevant circumstantial evidence in a manufacturer's action against the processors, the agreements and
acts of the extractors are not really issues in the treble damage suit.
64 Although the substantial similarity formulation may seem indeterminate or difficult
to apply, it must be noted that the calculation involved is much the same as is involved
in determining, under the "same cause of action" criterion, the res judicata effect of one
action on another, or whether a counterclaim is compulsory-questions encountered by
the courts with great regularity. See generally, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,
65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952). And the mechanics of the consideration of dissimilarities of
parties defendant does not seem to pose any qualitatively different problems from those
involved in the investigation of dissimilarities in any other sort of allegations in the two
complaints--such as of time, place, or actions-which a court is required to make under
the formulation.
65 It seems that the only situation in which proof of one firm's culpable behavior will
be necessary to proof of another firm's culpability under the antitrust laws is where the
two have acted in concert and the acts complained of were done in furtherance of an
unlawful conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade. In this sort of relationship, as
has been seen, liability is joint and several. This suggests that the guideline for applying
the tolling provision against non-government defendants might be framed in terms of
joint liability: the statute should only be tolled against a non-government defendant
where, under the allegations of the complaints, the defendants in the government action,
or some of them, would be liable for the private plaintiff's damages. It is questionable,
however, that this formulation adds anything to the one suggested in the text.
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the antitrust world. At the same time, some functional limitation on
the tolling provision's ambit is needed. Within the general framework
of substantial similarity, the case of dissimilarities of parties defendant
seems well governed by a limiting principle such as the one outlined
above.

